The Influence of Self-Deception in the Practice of Tax Evasion in Brazil

Ivone Vieira Pereira, Cesar Augusto Tibúrcio Silva

Abstract


Objective: The studies in the literature show that economic and behavioral factors have an influence on the practice of tax evasion. From this perspective, this research aimed to identify whether self-deception influences the practice of tax evasion in Brazil.

Method: Data was collected through a quasi-experiment, followed by the administration of a questionnaire, between November 2016 and September 2017. 800 data collection instruments were applied in loco in all the country’s geographical regions, 598 of which were validated. Measures were adopted to ensure the validity of content, criteria, and constructs.

Results: The reliability testing resulted in a Cronbach’s Alpha of 0.63, and the Composite Reliability was greater than 0.60. Data were analyzed through binary logistic regression. Following the multivariate approach, the results of this research suggest that self-deception influences the individual’s chances of tax evasion.

Originality/Relevance: This study differs from the others in that it considers tax evasion based on the influence of the taxpayer’s human behavior.

Theoretical/methodological contributions: Based on an interdisciplinary approach, this study contributes to the public administration in its determination of actions that may discourage tax evasion through the implementation of strategic policies that include the taxpayer’s behavioral factor.


Keywords


Logistic regression. Self-deception. Tax evasion. Categorization flexibility.

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DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.51341/1984-3925_2021v24n2a4

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