Influence of Board Independence on Earnings Management

Geovanne Dias de Moura, Ivonez Xavier de Almeida, Leidiane Andreola Dalla Vecchia, Sady Mazzioni

Abstract


The study verified the influence of board independence on earnings management. Descriptive, documentary and quantitative research was carried out on based on a sample of publicly-held companies from 2012 to 2015. Management was analyzed through discretionary accruals through the Jones Modified model. Three variables were used as proxy for council independence: 1) percentage of independent members; 2) dummy that captured when the majority of the members were independent; And, 3) a dummy that captured the existence of duality in the position of president of the council and of the president director. Regarding management, the results showed indicators of low proportions in most years. It was found that the average percentage of independent members in companies did not exceed 20%. The Companies with their council made up of independent members in the majority corresponded to 16% of the total. As for the duality in positions, it was found that there was a considerable reduction in the period. Finally, it was found that the board’s independence does not influence the level of management of the sample companies. The pressure exerted by the controlling shareholder and other internal directors may have contributed to reducing the positive impact of independent directors on results management.


Keywords


Board independence; Earnings Management; Publicly listed companies

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DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.21714/1984-3925_2017v20n3a4

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